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EducationPatients and consumersR Downie1
Successive governments of the UK have strongly supported two policies: an 
NHS free at the point of delivery, and the encouragement of consumer choice. 
It was natural for governments to think that amalgamating the policies 
would increase patient satisfaction, improve ef ciency and save money. 
There are many reasons why this has not been well-received by patients and 
doctors and has not saved money, but the underlying problem is that there 
is a conceptual mis t between healthcare as public policy and as individual responsibility. 
Patients in the NHS cannot become consumers and doctors cannot become suppliers of 
goods and services.
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Abstract
Introduction
Consumerism has been a growth movement since the 
Industrial Revolution and it rapidly developed in the 20th 
century. The movement emphasises that the free choice of 
consumers should affect the choice of manufacturers on 
what is produced and by that means orient the economic 
organisation of society.1 A policy of offering healthcare free at 
the point of need was outlined in the Beveridge Report of 1942 
and adopted by the British Government as the NHS in 1946. 
The consumerist movement and the NHS have both become 
very popular with the public. It is therefore not surprising that 
successive governments from the 1980s have made attempts 
to marry the two. The aim is to improve the NHS by introducing 
consumer choice while keeping the service free at the point 
of delivery. The hope is that the introduction of consumer 
choice will both increase patient/service-user satisfaction and 
improve efﬁ ciency. Although the idea of this marriage derives 
from right-wing free market assumptions, governments of a 
more left-wing persuasion have made no serious effort to 
reverse the trend to a consumer-based NHS. 
The general public however remain suspicious of what is 
seen as the privatisation of a public service, the healthcare 
professions remain critical or indeed hostile to consumerism 
in healthcare and the costs continue to rise. There are many 
reasons for these adverse effects, but from the philosophical 
point of view, the fundamental reason is a conceptual 
misﬁ t between a publicly funded service free at the point 
of delivery and the free market assumptions of consumer 
choice. I shall consider three areas of conceptual misﬁ t: (i) 
the incompatibility of patient choice and consumer choice, 
(ii) confusions over the term ‘best interests’, and (iii) the 
centrality of equity in a publicly funded service contrasted 
with its absence in a consumerist free market. 
Patient choice and consumer choice
The everyday conception of choice and consent to 
medical treatment
The word ‘choice’ is familiar in ordinary language where 
it overlaps and in some contexts is interchangeable with 
words such as ‘decide’ or ‘pick’. For example, a conjuror 
might equally say, ‘Choose a card’ or ‘Pick a card’, and 
looking at a holiday brochure we choose or decide where to 
go. Nevertheless, it is possible, without too much artiﬁ cial 
stipulation, to build up a model of choice as the term is 
used in ordinary language. First, a choice must be free 
from external constraints or pressures. This bald statement 
requires qualiﬁ cation. Friends urge us, advertisers persuade 
us, and many other constraints affect us, so that in a given 
context it might be debated how free a choice really was. 
Nevertheless it is not really contentious that a genuine choice 
requires some degree of freedom. Second, there must be 
at least a few alternatives, as in a chocolate box. Third, 
there must be a minimum of information: the diagram on the 
chocolate box lid might be adequate for that choice but the 
choice of a car would require much more information. Without 
the appropriate amount of information we are picking rather 
than choosing. Finally, we must take personal responsibility 
for the choice. If we don’t like what we have chosen our 
friends say, ‘It was your choice’. These conditions of choice 
in ordinary language – freedom, alternatives, information, 
responsibility – helpfully spell out the acronym FAIR, and I 
shall use the acronym as a convenient shorthand way to refer 
to the model of choice we accept in everyday life. 
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The ordinary conception of choice – FAIR – enters medical 
practice via the term more commonly used in healthcare – 
consent. Consent to medical treatment is now a foundation 
principle of medical ethics. Brieﬂ y, it has two main roots: 
the law of battery ,that it is a legal offence for one person 
to touch another without consent, and the ethical idea that 
we all have a right of self-determination with respect to our 
bodies. It should be noted here that ‘consent’ as used in 
medical law and ethics differs from the way the word is used 
in everyday speech. If you ask me to meet you for a drink after 
work and I say ‘Ok’, I have in the ordinary context consented 
to go for a drink. You are not required to spell out whether 
we will be drinking beer or coffee. In other words, ’consent’ 
in everyday contexts is just a matter of freely agreeing to 
what is proposed : it meets the ﬁ rst condition of the ordinary 
sense of ‘choice’. But in the medical context the doctor must 
also suggest possible alternatives and provide adequate 
information: conditions 2 and 3 of ‘FAIR’. The fourth condition 
– responsibility – is shared: the doctor takes responsibility 
for the alternatives, the information and the action plan, 
and the patient takes responsibility for choosing an offered 
action plan. In other words, the preferred medical model for 
consent simply adopts FAIR with the extra proviso that the 
responsibility for the ﬁ nal choice is shared.2
Consumer choice, competition and patient choice
But consumer choice has conditions additional to those 
stipulated in FAIR, and if consumer choice is to enter the 
NHS then these additional conditions must be present. 
These conditions are at variance with medical law and the 
traditions of medicine. The ﬁ rst of them is competition. From 
the time of Adam Smith, competition has been regarded as 
a necessary condition for a free market and therefore for 
consumer choice in that market. Consumerism requires 
competition of two sorts: between the consumers of goods 
and services and their suppliers; and among the suppliers of 
services. Successive governments from the 1980s have tried 
to introduce competition of both sorts to the NHS. 
Consider ﬁ rst the attempt to introduce competition between 
consumers (patients, or ‘service users’) and suppliers or 
providers (GPs or hospitals). To create competition in this 
context, league tables have been published, showing such 
results as waiting times, operation success rates, and so 
on. The measurements involved are often disputed but, even 
if we leave that aside, league tables do not help the vast 
majority of patients. For example, the elderly who make up 
the majority of patients may not have the skills or energy to 
investigate league tables, but must rely on advice from their 
GP; those who require urgent care via emergency services 
have to use the nearest service; and in general if you are ill 
you lack the energy to get involved in competition. Choice 
overload can cause the debilitating effects of bewilderment 
and high levels of stress and anxiety. Genuine competition 
between patients and providers is an illusion.3
Turning now to competition between different providers we 
encounter another kind of problem. The foot soldiers of the 
NHS are the doctors and nurses who serve the patients. 
But the process of their education and tradition is quite 
contrary to the ethos of competition. From the start of 
medical education, students are taught together and share 
a curriculum which is largely similar for all students, and 
even extra-curricular activities reinforce the ethos by informal 
student societies, such as ‘year clubs’. Such factors play a 
role in inculcating a sense of loyalty even in the earliest years. 
This loyalty is directed partly towards the institution and its 
members, but also towards medicine itself. In later years, 
ways of relating to patients and other health workers, even in 
other institutions, becomes part of medical professionalism. 
The professional ethic of medicine is quite inimical to the 
individualistic ethic of commercial competition.
It might be objected to this point that whereas medical 
professionalism may be incompatible with institutional 
competition it is in fact the managers and chief executives 
of hospitals who will manage the competition. While this is 
true, this truth creates another problem for competition in the 
NHS. The problem is that managerial attempts to encourage 
a competitive spirit among doctors, say by stressing the 
importance of meeting targets, can create disharmony 
between management and medical staff. The medical ethos 
is concerned with patient care, rather than targets.
This suggests that since consumer choice requires 
competition to be added to the sense of choice (FAIR), 
which underlies joint decision-making in medicine, then 
consumer choice sits in tension with medical practice. 
Patients are able to decide whether they prefer Tesco or 
Waitrose but the evaluation of league tables is much harder 
and sometimes impossible. Moreover, the traditional ethos 
of medical education and its resultant professionalism is 
quite inimical to that of competition. But competition is not 
the only problem that arises for consumer choice in the NHS. 
Two further problems concern the alternatives for choice and 
the locus of responsibility.
Alternatives and responsibility in patient choice and 
consumer choice
In FAIR the alternatives are displayed, for example on the 
lid of the chocolate box, and in the development of this in 
a medical situation the treatment alternatives are outlined 
by the doctor. In other words, the number of possible 
choices is limited. But the choices of consumerism are not 
constrained in this way. If one shop does not have the product 
another might or the consumer can go online and have the 
commodities of the world available. There are no limits to 
the number of alternatives and it is the consumer who is 
the dominant ﬁ gure. Current political policy is to develop a 
version of this enlarged idea of competitive consumer choice 
within the NHS. The hope is that if one hospital cannot offer 
the treatment or care regime then perhaps another can. If 
medical research suggests that a treatment is not adequately 
tested or cost-effective then the consumer ethos encourages 
patients to write to the newspapers or their MP and it is 
likely to be made available. Indeed, there is general protest, 
sometimes extending to outrage, if a cancer treatment is 
judged not to be cost-effective and therefore not provided 
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on the NHS. The underlying problem here is that of equity 
for the NHS, which I shall discuss in a separate section. 
But in addition to raising problems of equity, the extensive 
alternatives of consumer choice also raise problems about 
the locus of responsibility in a medical situation. 
In FAIR and its extension to joint decision-making, the locus 
of responsibility is clear: the doctor has responsibility for 
offering the choices and carrying out the one chosen by the 
patient. But on a consumer choice model the patient might 
say: ‘I have read about a certain treatment on the internet 
and that is the one I want.’ In other words, the patient can 
widen the range of choices. Doctors are not infallible and 
perhaps after consideration the doctor might agree with the 
patient’s preference. But the doctor might judge that the 
patient’s choice is not cost-effective or not tested, and refuse 
to grant it. Where does the responsibility for choice lie? To 
illustrate the problem here let us take an example.
Suppose I wish to purchase a computer and explain to the 
retailer that it is for word processing, emails and other simple 
tasks. The shop assistant suggests one or two models, but 
my eye alights on one with a spectacular screensaver, and I 
say that I want that one. The assistant patiently explains that 
that model is complex and is really for scientiﬁ c purposes. 
I insist and put my money down. The shop assistant having 
provided adequate information has no duty to refuse the 
sale. But if after a week of despair I return it to the shop the 
seller has no duty to take it back. The point is that having 
been given adequate information, the purchaser carries the 
responsibility for the choice. But this situation does not 
apply in medicine. In law it is the doctor who carries the 
responsibility. In other words, the locus of responsibility in the 
two contexts of consumerism and medical professionalism 
are incompatible.4
Best interests
It is often said that one merit of a consumer-based system is 
that it enables patients to achieve their own best interests. 
The assumption here is that patients know their own best 
interests whereas in the NHS, doctors decide what is in the 
patient’s best interests. In support of this assumption it can 
be pointed out that in the FAIR model of choice, as it applies 
to medical decision-making, it is the doctor who offers the 
treatment choices in what the doctor decides is the patient’s 
best interests. But there is a confusion here that arises 
from an ambiguity in the concept of ‘interest’, an ambiguity 
between a psychological and a normative sense. ‘Best 
interests’ in the psychological sense refers to choices arising 
from what people actually want to have. ‘Autonomous choice’ 
is usually interpreted in this way as a choice expressing what 
the patient wants. But ‘best interests’ in the normative sense 
refers to what a patient ought to have, whether or not he in 
fact wants the offered treatment. For example, it might be 
in a person’s best interests in the normative sense to take 
some exercise or cut down on sugar but he might not want 
to. As we say to the relative reluctant to accept the treatment, 
‘It’s for your own good’.
Now, in the framework or value-base of consumerism the 
psychological and the normative senses will run together, 
for a person’s best interest in such a framework or value-
base is simply the satisfaction of his wants. But in the 
framework or value-base of medicine the psychological and 
normative sense of ‘best interests’ are quite separate, and 
the doctor’s professional duty is to offer treatments from the 
normative interpretation of ‘best interests’. This normative 
view will have two components: a duty to promote the health 
of patients where possible, and an awareness of the safety 
and cost-effectiveness of treatments. Of course the patient 
is entitled in law to refuse the doctor’s offer of choices based 
on this normative view of best interests, even in cases where 
life-prolonging treatment is involved.5 But the central point is 
that the psychological sense of ‘best interests’ expresses 
the value base of consumerism while the normative sense 
expresses that of medical professionalism.6
Equity
An important principle that ought to guide but not wholly 
determine public policy is utility, or the maximising of beneﬁ t 
for the majority of a population. This general principle turns 
into speciﬁ c economic tools such as cost/beneﬁ t analysis 
or quality-adjusted life years and is presented to the public 
as ‘value for money’. But it is obvious that this ought not to 
be the only guiding principle. For example, suppose a doctor 
is faced with a patient who might beneﬁ t from an expensive 
drug. In terms of maximising beneﬁ t to the community at large 
it might be better to ignore the needs of patients with that 
kind of condition and spend the resources on those whose 
need is less severe but who might beneﬁ t more. But this 
policy seems wrong in that it ignores the rights of individuals 
to equal consideration. No one ought to be regarded simply 
as expendable for the sake of the good of others.
This notion of ‘equal consideration’, however, needs more 
examination. In some contexts the demand for equal 
consideration is simply a demand for consistency of 
treatment between one person and another. In other words, 
it is a demand that people be treated in accordance with a 
rule which can be formulated. But the demand for consistency 
seems to clash with the more personalised side to casework 
in the NHS; general rules conﬂ ict with the uniqueness of 
individual situations. On the other hand, patients are keen to 
demand consistency and criticise anything which smacks of 
a ‘postcode lottery’. Consistency seems to be a necessary 
condition for the distribution of medical or social beneﬁ ts to 
patient groups if such distribution is to be seen as fair. But 
consistency is certainly not sufﬁ cient for fairness. After all, 
a principle such as ‘Never spend time with anyone who is 
disabled or alcoholic’ could be applied consistently. To get 
nearer the moral principle of equal consideration we need 
some way of ruling out such possibilities.
It is tempting to try to do this by saying that what is required 
is not consistency but an actual equality of treatment. But 
this is not satisfactory either. As pointed out above, clinicians 
stress that some people need much more help than others 
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within patient groups, and no one thinks it reasonable to 
spend the same amount of time and money whatever the 
problem. What is required is that all differences of treatment 
be based on a criterion which will group like cases together, 
and distinguish unlike cases, for morally appropriate reasons. 
This principle of justiﬁ ed differences in treatment is usually 
called a principle of equity. Equity is not the same as equality, 
since it requires not only that like cases should be treated 
equally but also that unlike cases should be treated unequally. 
Equity presupposes a criterion for justiﬁ able differences 
in the way people are treated. In the context of illness or 
disease this criterion will be need (although in other contexts 
criteria such as merit, or ability to beneﬁ t, might be relevant).7
But this analysis highlights the problem of what is to be 
meant by ‘need’, a term which is easy to pass over since 
it is so familiar in this kind of discussion. A ‘need’ arises 
from a desire or an aim to reach a certain goal; that which is 
needed is instrumental for attaining the goal. But what is the 
goal in healthcare? Some economists propose a very wide 
goal, and deﬁ ne need as a ‘capacity to beneﬁ t’.8 According to 
this deﬁ nition, people ‘need’ from health and social services 
anything that might benefit their health and wellbeing. 
But that would include good housing, lack of deprivation, 
rewarding employment, and so on. Patient groups might well 
say ‘Yes, that is what we do need!’ But there is the problem 
of resources and their allocation not only for health groups, 
but also for other areas requiring spending from the public 
purse, such as education, defence and the arts. It is therefore 
arguable that ‘capacity to beneﬁ t’ is too broad a deﬁ nition 
of need. The American ethicists, Beauchamp and Childress, 
suggest a narrower deﬁ nition of ‘need’ as ‘that without which 
one will be fundamentally harmed’.9 This provides a minimum 
level for the relief of needs. But it must be remembered 
that the USA takes a much narrower view of what the state 
should provide by way of health and welfare beneﬁ ts than 
would be acceptable in the UK. It might be preferable for 
those in healthcare to drop the idea of a ‘needs assessment’ 
and to concentrate on speciﬁ c goals: the alleviation of pain 
and discomfort, the restoration or maintenance of function 
and the prolongation of life of a human quality.10 But even 
with speciﬁ c goals, controversy will remain. In the context of 
scarce resources we shall probably never be free of disputes 
about both government policies and ‘postcode lotteries’. 
The implication of all this is that there is really no escape 
from some form of rationing, whatever politicians may say, 
or whatever is their preferred term – ‘prioritising’ or the like 
– or preferred method of rationing.
 But however imperfect these attempts at prioritising may be, 
they have the merit that they attempt to incorporate some 
conception of equity in the distribution of a public good such 
as healthcare. On the other hand, in the pure form of a free 
market consumerist system of healthcare, equity and utility 
do not feature at all. Treatment alternatives are the choice 
and responsibility of the individual patient; the principles of 
utility and equity are simply not relevant because healthcare 
is a choice for the consumer rather than a public good. 
Basically you would get what you paid for. There would of 
course be legal principles covering such matters as safety 
and redress over negligence. But it would be up to patients – 
who are now healthcare consumers – to compare insurance 
companies and work out the package that best and least 
expensively implements their choices, and up to insurance 
companies to work out which packages are likely to be the 
most proﬁ table for them. The principles of utility and equity 
are totally irrelevant to this kind of system, but are essential 
for the working of a publicly-funded system of healthcare. 
No doubt a case can be made for each sort of system but 
the attempt to combine systems with incompatible logical 
structures leads to confusion and inconsistency.
Conclusion
I have argued that joint decision-making, currently the 
preferred model in the NHS, represents a development of 
the everyday conception of choice which I encapsulated in 
the acronym FAIR. The consumerist model of choice however 
adds elements not present in either FAIR or joint decision-
making: competition, a wider range of alternatives and a 
change in the locus of responsibility. Moreover, a consumerist 
view of best interests – ‘my interests are to get what I want’ – 
may conﬂ ict with medical values: ‘the patient’s best interests 
are expressed by the attainable medical good’. Underlying all 
these conﬂ icts is the problem that a consumerist free market 
system does not require the principles of equity and utility 
that are essential in a publicly funded system such as the 
NHS. Of course a consumerist system has merits – such as 
stressing individual responsibility for healthcare – and it may 
therefore be preferred by some societies. But the attempt 
to combine a consumerist system with one which is publicly 
funded will give rise to tensions and contradictions, rather 
like the attempt to combine incongruent triangles. 
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